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Abstract
This essay is an attempt to think ‘mobile peoples’ as a political concept. I consider mobile peoples as a norm rather than
an exception and as political subjects rather than subject peoples. After discussing the tension between ‘mobile’ and ‘peo-
ples’, I draw on Ian Hacking’s historical ontology for understanding how a people comes to be. For understanding how the
people comes to be, or rather, how the tension between a people that constitutes itself as a whole and those peoples that
remain as residual parts, I draw on Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Rancière, and Ernesto Laclau as authors who identified this
tension as a fundamental problem of ‘Western’ political thought. Yet, their inattention to territory drawsme to James Scott
whose work on early states challenges how we have come to understand the people as sedentary in the first place. His
account of how ‘barbarians’ (mobile peoples) came to be seen as a threat to sedentary peoples enables us to understand
that tension. Then a path opens toward thinking about mobile peoples as a political concept.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades research in fields such as mi-
gration studies, refugee studies, citizenship studies and
mobility studies has demonstrated that human mobil-
ity involves complex movements: iterative migrations
across countries; massive relocations and displacements
within countries and across their cities and regions; in-
tricate combined and uneven geographies; interwoven
histories of recurrent and seasonal movements; increas-
ing use ofmobile technologies in practices of governance
and resistance; intersections of affective, cultural and po-
litical identities, and hybrid cultural, linguistic, and so-
cial formations (Cresswell, 2006; Elliott & Urry, 2010;
Hannam, Mostafanezhad, & Rickly-Boyd, 2016; Merri-
man, 2012). This research has shifted our attention away
frommigration as a one-waymovement often across and
within state borders. Instead, how mobile peoples, of all
kinds and inmultiple ways, produce novel social, political
and cultural lives, knowledge and practices, and thereby
drive political change has become an issue (Adey, Bis-
sell, Hannam, Merriman, & Sheller, 2014; Gold & Nawyn,
2013; Isin & Nyers, 2014).
Thus, scholars regard the often-cited figures such as
that nearly a quarter of a billion people live in coun-
tries other than their birth (as of 2015) or that this
is a 41 per cent increase since 2000 rather sceptically.
For these are not mere descriptions of human mobility
(UN, 2015). They are also ascriptions that shape how we
understand human mobility as one-way movement be-
tween or across states. The uses of statistics for public
policy in migration and immigration and in general con-
cerning human mobility understood as one-way cross-
state migration are fraught with struggles over meanings
and functions of such figures (Boswell, 2009). There are
increasingly critical studies of the ways in which migra-
tion, immigration and mobility are constituted as prob-
lems to be managed, solved, and contained rather than
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seeingmobile peoples as political subjects who are creat-
ing new forms of life (Geiger, 2013; Manderscheid, 2016;
Pécoud, 2015). There are also studies critical of constitut-
ing mobility as an independent fact from reflexive and
agentic involvement of people right across the spectrum
frommobile to immobile (Frello, 2008). Perhaps because
of this shift national and international authorities, agen-
cies, and organisations are beginning to recognize that,
rather than being a problem that can be solved or man-
aged, the mobility of people is shaping and structuring
the terms of contemporary political life.
That these critical studies are changing our views
of people on the move beyond Eurocentrism and state-
centrism is a welcome development (Lucassen & Lu-
cassen, 2014, 2017). Perhaps this is now the moment
that we ask a historical question regarding why ‘mobile
peoples’ were constituted as an exception (and a prob-
lem) in the first place. This might involve thinking big
about mobile peoples as Elizabeth Zanoni (2017) put it
when describing the pioneering work of Donna Gabaccia
(1999). I want to argue here that it requires genealogical
investigations of the concept of ‘people’ and the func-
tions it has come to perform. There are certainly differ-
ent ways to approach this question but a historical ap-
proach to ‘mobile peoples’ as a political concept requires
two moves.
First, exploring the possibilities of recognizing ‘mo-
bile peoples’ as a norm rather than exception goes
against the grain of dominant perspectives. The concept
‘people’ itself already signifies immobile, sedentary, and
enclosed body politic bounded within a territory. Thus,
seeing ‘mobile peoples’ as a norm requires exploring
how ‘people’ has come to acquire its dominant signifi-
cation in the first place. Second, developing ‘mobile peo-
ples’ as a political concept that restores political subjec-
tivity tomobile peoples requires exploring the conditions
under which ‘mobile peoples’ have become objects of
government. This means recognizing the difficulties of
the concept ‘people’ and the differences between the
people and peoples as its parts.
The first move—to consider ‘mobile peoples’ as a
norm rather than an exception—may appear easier than
the second move—to consider ‘mobile peoples’ a polit-
ical subject. We can, for example, argue that humans
have always been on the move (Feldman, 2015; Panayi
& Virdee, 2011). Or, as Jürgen Osterhammel (2009) has
argued, the emergence of ‘modern’ population move-
ments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were
the foundations of our age. Or, we can appeal to the
uniqueness of the twenty-first century to argue that the
concept ‘mobile peoples’ covers not only those forwhom
crossing all sorts of borders is decisive for the way in
which they live their lives, but also those whose lives are
implicated in the lives of those who move. It includes
those who move by force or by choice, those who cut
ties or stay in touch, those who return once or many
times, as well as those who are left behind. We can ar-
gue that there are categories ofmobile peoples including
diplomats, families, investors, pensioners, refugees, stu-
dents, travellers, tourists, and workers who dwell or in-
habit these variousmobilities.We can accept it as a social
fact that, for example, grandparents whose livelihood de-
pends on remittances from their migrant grandchildren
are as much a part of this mobility as their grandchildren.
We can argue that mobility shapes more than just the
lives of those who are on the move. Consequently, we
can argue that it also has an impact on social and political
institutions and practices through which people arrange
and govern their lives.
All these arguments are possible. But I wonder if
we are not valorizing ostensible facts rather than ask-
ing questions about our changing perspectives on peo-
ples living mobile lives? To put it differently, is there
not a problem in appealing to autonomous facts with-
out considering the conditions under which such facts
have come into being (Buscher, Urry, & Witchger, 2011;
Cresswell, 2006; Elliott & Urry, 2010)? Do we not need
to become sceptical about making such appeals without
considering how, where, and when mobile peoples have
become a concern or even a problem for various govern-
mental authorities and under which new modes are mo-
bile peoples being governed? (Endres, Manderscheid, &
Mincke, 2016). If we are to articulate the transformative
effects of people living mobile lives on political life in the
present, wewill need to have a critical approach towards
the terms under whichwe are describingmobile peoples.
Thus, rather than making an appeal for mobile peoples
as a norm rather than an exception based on ostensi-
bly independent facts I want to discuss how we should
approach the concept ‘people’ in the first place. That is
why the next two sections will make up the bulk of this
essay examining political genealogies of the concept of
people—first ‘a people’ and then ‘the people’. We shall
see that the passage from ‘a people’ to ‘the people’ is
not only a passage through which a people becomes a
sovereign political subject but also a sedentary (as op-
posed to mobile) political subject.
2. What Is a People?
What is a people? This is a difficult question because
the naming of a people is always a performative rather
than a descriptive act. The naming of a people is a dou-
ble act: as it names a people it also mobilizes the named
to act as a people. Here Ian Hacking’s performative ap-
proach to how kinds of people appear in language and
how this language invites people into becoming one is im-
mensely helpful. Hacking captures this process by using
two terms: making up a people and looping effect (Hack-
ing, 2007, pp. 289–290). Both terms owe to a performa-
tive understanding of the relations between words and
things that Hacking calls ‘historical ontology’ both to indi-
cate his debt to Michel Foucault (1997) and to signify his
own approach that he calls ‘dynamic nominalism’. Histor-
ical ontology also owes to Friedrich Nietzsche (2001) and
J.L Austin (1962) but I leave these influences out of this
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discussion and focus briefly on Hacking and why his work
is essential for the question I am articulating.
Hacking begins with the assumption that words and
things are effects of each other (Hacking, 2002, p. 3). To
understand these effects we need to understand beings
and coming into beings as historical developments. The
beings that become things such as classifications, ideas,
peoples, or institutions are all objects of historical ontol-
ogy in the sense that we cannot understand these things
without tracing their histories. These objects make sense
only insofar as we understand how they came into be-
ing and acquired their meanings. For example, Hacking
says, ‘the idea that peoples just separate naturally into
overarching racial, ethnic, or linguistic groups is largely a
product of a recent invention, the nation state’ (Hacking,
2007, p. 289). There is no reason to assume that we will
find these things in the past in the samemanner in which
we understand them in the present or that these things
in the present are evolved versions of the things in the
past. Thus, historical ontology considers ‘kinds of peo-
ple’ as having come into being historically as invented de-
scriptions through which people constitute themselves
as acting beings. Such descriptions become embedded
in human practices and provide ways of acting and being
in the world. All acts are acts performed under a descrip-
tion. If new descriptions come into being new possibili-
ties for action come into being in consequence (Hacking,
2002, p. 108). It is in this sense that the act of naming
a people is an act of ‘making up a people’. Unless peo-
ple take up these descriptions and act upon them and
each other a description would not have any performa-
tive force. When people act they interact with descrip-
tions and this creates a looping effect where descriptions
acquire performative force. The name (words) and the
named (things) interact. Hacking insists that this process
is dynamic in the sense that there is no static moment in
the looping effect where the named can be said to be the
effect of the name or vice versa. Instead, the name and
the named are constituted dynamically.
Hacking names five dynamic moments through
which words and things become effects of each other.
First, a description appears about the kind of people. Sec-
ond, people begin to act under this description. Third,
institutions emerge to manage the kind of people act-
ing under this description. Fourth, knowledge about the
kind of people in question appears: their characteristics,
fierce or docile, artistic or warlike, artisans or hunters etc.
Fifth, authorities, expertise, and administration of peo-
ple emerges that regulate the kind of people acting un-
der this description. A historical ontology of a kind of
people means to investigate how and when these five
dynamic moments were present and how its description
became possible and was transformed. Hacking gives ex-
amples of various kinds of people (Hacking, 2007, p. 285).
He speaks, for example, about the avalanche of numbers
in the nineteenth century on various categories of peo-
ple: murderers, thieves, prostitutes, drunks, vagrants, in-
sane, poor, and all sorts of deviants. Where did these
people come from? Did they not exist before the nine-
teenth century in some form? Hacking says things that
people did to get classified existed historically (e.g., steal-
ing, killing, drinking) but how those things were used to
describe, enumerate and classify people are made up
and change often. He says ‘even national and provincial
censuses amazingly show that the categories into which
people fall change every ten years. Social change creates
new categories of people, but the counting is nomere re-
port of developments. It elaborately, often philanthropi-
cally, creates new ways for people to be’ (Hacking, 2002,
p. 100). The categories that Hacking mentions involve
many different ‘ways to be’ such as those of sexuality or
ethnicity or race. Hacking, for example, says ‘the homo-
sexual and the heterosexual as kinds of persons (as ways
to be persons, or as conditions of personhood) came into
being only toward the end of the nineteenth century’
(Hacking, 2002, p. 103). Historically there were sex acts
between individuals, but it came under familiar and rec-
ognizable (sayable and visible) descriptions only in the
nineteenth century. And there is no guarantee that these
descriptions will live forever. So his claim:
Is not that there was a kind of person who came in-
creasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or by stu-
dents of human nature, but rather that a kind of per-
son came into being at the same time as the kind itself
was being invented. (Hacking, 2002, p. 106)
So, the argument is not that a kind of people never ex-
isted before and came into being at a certain moment.
Nor is it that a kind of people always existed and that it
was named in a particular moment. Rather, at a certain
moment in history people did not experience themselves
in this particular way, they did not interact with other
people in this way, and were not treated by knowledge,
institutions, authorities under this description. Thus, the
making up people is a complex performative event that
requires historical ontology to investigate.
When Hacking talks about ‘making up people’ he
means kinds of people. These are kinds of people such as
murderers, dandies, flaneurs, blacks, homosexuals, and
so on that constitute ‘parts’ of a ‘whole’. These kinds of
people as ‘parts’ are unimaginable unless there are kinds
of people who have been constituted as a ‘whole’. This
is a problem that Hacking does not address. A people
(or peoples) can be described only when there is a dif-
ference between peoples (parts) and the people (whole).
The people as a whole involves a more complicated his-
torical ontology than Hacking implies including the rela-
tion between parts and wholes. This is because the com-
plex interplay betweenwords and things that Hacking ad-
dresses involves power relations and there are plays of
domination in these descriptions. The description ‘black’
or ‘gay’ is not only a description under which a people
will act but also an asymmetrical signifier under which a
people will be acted upon—will be subjected to govern-
ment. Moreover, it is one thing to see how the category
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ofmurderers has comeabout; it is another to understand
how the category Jewish or French people was brought
into being. The question that opens up here is not only
the invention of kinds of people but also with the in-
vention of the people. To put it differently, the question
what is a people inevitably leads to the question what is
the people.
Hannah Arendt in the 1940s and Michel Foucault in
the 1970s came to this problem of the difference be-
tween a people and the people (Isin, 2012). Arendt fa-
mously argued that it was in the nineteenth century that
the nation as a people conquered the state. Her geneal-
ogy of race-thinking, for example, led her to understand
the dangers of instituting a state as a nation. Similarly,
Foucault investigated how nations became the nation in
the nineteenth century. For both the making up of peo-
ples in Europe as nations generated peoples as ‘minori-
ties’. What we learned from Arendt and Foucault is that
a genealogy of ‘the people’ inevitably leads to the kinds
of people it generates.
3. What Is the People?
How does a people become a people? Does a people
become only that which it is? If so, then what is it?
How can we know: (1) What a people in general is?
(2) What this or that people is? (3) What we ourselves
are? (Heidegger, 2012)
It is not perhaps surprising that before Arendt in the
1940s and Foucault in the 1970s, Martin Heidegger was
confronted by a question in the 1930s of the difference
between a people and the people. For the purposes of il-
lustrating the difficulties of considering the concept ‘mo-
bile peoples’ we would need a historical ontology from
ancient Greek demos to Roman plebeians to medieval
Italian popolo illustrating how various peoples became
remainders or residuals of the people.Margaret Canovan
(2005) traces precisely this particular history. She reveals
a constitutive tension between ‘the people’ which dif-
ferentiates itself from the unruly, poor, rapturous and
eruptive peoples. She notes that the respectable, uni-
fied, and virtuous stories of ‘the people’ are always nar-
rated against the unruly mob or herd. Canovan already
provides us the view that the difference between a peo-
ple and the people or even a passage from a people to
the people involves domination. Alain Badiou puts this
starkly when he says:
The word ‘people’ was only suitable for the conquer-
ing powers, elated by the conquest itself: ‘the French
people,’ ‘the English people,’ yes….But the Algerian
people, the Vietnamese people? No! And even today
for the Israeli government, ‘the Palestinian people’?
An even louder no. (Badiou, 2016, pp. 22–23)
Yet, it was Giorgio Agamben (2000) who identified this
tension as a constitutive question of ‘Western’ politics.
Agamben insists that ‘any interpretation of the political
meaning of the term people ought to start from the pe-
culiar fact that in modern European languages this term
always indicates also the poor, the underprivileged, and
the excluded. The same term names the constitutive
political subject as well as the class that is excluded—
de facto, if not de jure—from politics’ (Agamben, 2000,
p. 29). From the beginning of political thinking about
‘people’ there is an ambiguity whether it means the con-
stitutive dominant (the people) or the dominated (a peo-
ple) or both. For Agamben then ‘such a widespread and
constant semantic ambiguity cannot be accidental: it
surely reflects an ambiguity inherent in the nature and
function of the concept of people in Western politics’
(Agamben, 2000, p. 31). According to Agamben ‘this also
means, however, that the constitution of the human
species into a body politic comes into being through a
fundamental split and that in the concept of people we
can easily recognize the conceptual pair identified ear-
lier as the defining category of the original political struc-
ture: naked life (people) and political existence (People),
exclusion and inclusion, zoē and bios’ (Agamben, 2000,
pp. 31–32). Agamben concludes that:
The concept of people always already contains within
itself the fundamental biopolitical fracture. It is what
cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part
as well as what cannot belong to the whole in which
it is always already included (Agamben, 2000, p. 32,
emphasis original)
Thus, ‘If this is the case—if the concept of people neces-
sarily contains within itself the fundamental biopolitical
fracture—it is possible to read anew some decisive pages
of the history of our century’ (Agamben, 2000, p. 33). Al-
though Agamben identifies this fracture and insists on
reading anew certain events of the twentieth century,
he also implies that this fracture is so fundamental that
it requires examining the entire ‘Western’ political his-
tory. I am aware of the massive debate about Agamben’s
interpretations of Arendt and Foucault and concerning
his differentiation between zoē and bios but I consider
his point about the fundamental fracture in Western po-
litical theory as a serious challenge to think about peo-
ple genealogically.
I will locate mobile peoples within this fracture af-
ter I discuss Jacques Rancière and Ernesto Laclau who
have taken up this challenge seriously. Both start from
the proposition that there is indeed a fundamental frac-
ture or tension exists between ‘the people’ as a whole
and a people or peoples as its parts. I will briefly discuss
how each attempts to work this tension to use it critically
to think about ‘people’ as a political concept.
Rancière’s description of the whole and parts of an-
cient politics is well known. I’ll briefly summarize here
how he addresses the fundamental fracture of West-
ern politics that Agamben identifies. If indeed we can
describe the ‘whole’ as any given polity and ‘parts’ as
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 115–123 118
its constitutive elements how is their relation decided?
For Rancière what gives rise to politics is the dispute
about what counts as parts. He says dominant interpre-
tations of ancient politics hitherto read this politics aris-
ing from an already constituted polity and its already ex-
isting conflicts; however, he says, it is actually the other
way around. Any polity is founded on politics that arises
from what he calls counting the parts that constitute it.
Politics involves counting of parts and its disputes about
what counts that constitutes a polity.
Let’s recall that for Rancière there are two ways
of counting: arithmetic and geometric. These two ways
are not so much as descriptions of counting as ways
of approaching how one counts. It enables Rancière to
schematize two ways of thinking about politics. An arith-
metic counting assumes that all is accounted for (hence
always a false count); a geometric counting counts those
parts that have no part. When counting is arithmetic (as
in what is counted) it accounts for what is given; when
it is geometric (as in what counts) it accounts for what is
not given. Yet, and this is crucial, counts are always false
counts as they fall short of considering of what actually
counts. Politics arises from this paradox of being unable
to and yet need to count parts (Rancière, 1998, p. 6). It
arises when those who have no part actually struggle to
make themselves count (Rancière, 1998, p. 9). What is
political about making themselves count is that the parts
that have no part identify themselves to be the whole of
the polity. It is this audacious identification that is politi-
cal. This is, for example, the historical significance of de-
mos in Athenian politics. The claim of demos is not only
to make itself count but also to constitute itself as the
whole. So, then the languageof thosewhohave nopart is
not about an essential struggle between the rich and the
poor, between this and that class, or between this and
that social group. Politics is not an opposition between
the rich and the poor. Rather, politics is the interruption
of an order of domination by the institution of a part of
those who have no part (Rancière, 1998, p. 11).
So far in this account we have spoken about peoples
or the people. For translating whole and parts language
into peoples and the people categories Rancière intro-
duces two terms: equality and wrong. The struggles of
those who have no part to institute themselves as a part
is basedon their claims to equality and it arises from their
declaration ofwrong, an injustice. The claim to inequality
is necessary for the declaration of wrong and that decla-
ration is impossible without the assumption of equality
of speech and capacity, an equal part in dispute. If indeed
‘politics exists wherever the count of parts and parties of
society is disturbed by the inscription of a part of those
who have no part’ it begins when the equality of any-
one and everyone is inscribed in the liberty of the peo-
ple (Rancière, 1998, p. 123). And ‘this liberty of the peo-
ple is an empty property, an improper property through
which those who are nothing purport that their group is
identical to thewhole of the community’ (Rancière, 1998,
pp. 123–124). So, the passage of a people to the people,
its claim, is the origins of politics (or how ‘Western’ poli-
tics perceives its origins).
What is this whole, that a people identifieswith? Ran-
cière says that ‘the people’ has a double embodiment: it
is both the name of awhole polity and the name of a part
of that polity. The gap between these two names of the
people is the site of a grievance (Rancière, 1995, p. 97).
From our perspective of thinking about mobile peoples
as a people, Rancière’s key argument is that while an-
cient politics understood this gap, modern politics can-
not tolerate it. Modern politics cannot accept that the
people simultaneously can be both dominant and domi-
nated, whole and part, sedentary and mobile (Rancière,
1995, p. 99). For Rancière in modern politics ‘the appear-
ance of the people must be strictly confined to the at-
tributes of sovereignty or the appearance of sovereignty
dissolved in favour of the realities of the people as pro-
ducers’ (Rancière, 1995, p. 99). So, then this gap between
a people and the people is both a challenge to and trig-
ger of politics; ancients understood it, moderns cannot
tolerate it.
Although not concerned with the ancient origins or
lineages of modern politics, Laclau is very close to Ran-
cière in his attempt to work this tension for understand-
ing something key about politics. At the centre of his ar-
gument is the concept of socio-political ‘demands’ artic-
ulated by the dominated to the dominant (hegemonic)
order. The dominated articulate an exclusion or depriva-
tion as their grievance and this articulation as a demand
constitutes a people (Laclau, 2005, p. 123). As with Ran-
cière then a people is not a given sociological concept
but something that arises from within politics. This rec-
ognizes that there is a constitutive asymmetry between a
polity understood as awhole (the populus) and the domi-
nated as its part (the plebs). For Laclau, as for Rancière, it
is crucial that the plebs identify themselves with the pop-
ulus as the polity as a whole (Laclau, 2005, p. 224). Thus,
as in Rancière, the plebs function both as part of a whole
and a part that is the whole (Laclau, 2005, p. 225). The
logic of hegemony that arises from this tension between
the part and the whole implies that the whole is ‘contam-
inated’ by the part and the part contains the whole. The
analytical distinction between the universal and the par-
ticular as though they aremutually exclusive opposites is
thus false and belies the logic of hegemony (Laclau, 2005,
p. 226). For Laclau the ambiguity of ‘the people’ both
as the populus and the plebs is not a logical contradic-
tion but expresses the logic of hegemony. Where Laclau
differs from Rancière is that while Rancière seems to as-
sume that the constitution of the part that has no part
will always invoke a politics of emancipation Laclau does
not think that can be determined theoretically (Laclau,
2005, p. 246). Laclau also differs from Rancière in insist-
ing on limits of philosophical analysis and the necessity
of sociological investigation of theways inwhich the logic
of hegemony constitutes a people (Laclau, 2005, p. 248).
What is important in both Rancière and Laclau, from
our point of view, is their insistence on taking the ten-
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sion between parts and the whole as the constitutive
tension of politics. But I find it difficult to accept their in-
sistence that politics inevitably if not essentially involves
the construction or formation of a people as a whole—
the people. More specifically, the requirement that parts
must identify with the whole to take part always justi-
fies becoming a kind of people that the people already
is. If, as Rancière says, there is no politics beyond and
outside this configuration of the whole and its parts and
that ‘there is only the order of domination or the dis-
order of revolt’ then how does the configuration itself
gets disrupted (Rancière, 1998, p. 12)? If we follow Ran-
cière and Laclau in insisting that the whole (the people)
and its parts (peoples) are implicated in each other then
to what extent can we imagine a people that will not
identify with the people? Both Rancière and Laclau de-
fine politics as rupture in a given order but why this rup-
ture should be conceived as the formation of the people,
as identification with the whole, is never explained. La-
clau says that the formation of a people involves an act
of institution and as an act it does not derive its force
‘from any logic already operating within the preceding
situation’ and that ‘what is crucial for the emergence of
“the people” as a new historical actor is that the unifi-
cation of plurality of demands in a new configuration is
constitutive and not derivative’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 228). It
sounds like Laclau is overcoming the tension and we can,
with some modifications, agree with him. But he then
adds ‘it constitutes an act in the strict sense, for it does
not have its source in anything external to itself’ (Laclau,
2005, p. 224). Whether we work the tension between a
people (or peoples) and the people as a gap that consti-
tutes politics (Rancière) or a contamination that consti-
tutes polity (Laclau) we are still left with a fundamental
fracture that is always signified against a whole that is
already constituted. This leaves mobile peoples with no
possibility beyond either becoming sedentary or remain-
ing outside politics.
4. Mobile Peoples: Transversal Configurations
There are two obstacles to understanding mobile peo-
ples with Rancière and Laclau and, for that matter, with
Agamben and perhaps even Hacking. First, in all their
theorizing a people remains without geography. Each
emphasizes the importance of understanding a people
with their history, but their peoples remain without ge-
ography. Warning against writing peoples without his-
tory, each practically treats peoples without geography.
What I mean by this can be illustrated by James Scott’s
remark that ‘a great many apparently ethnic names turn
out to be, when translated literally, a description of a
people’s geography, applied to them by state discourse:
“hill people,” “swamp dwellers,” “forest people,” “people
of the steppes”’ (Scott, 2017). Or, we can add contem-
porary examples: people without permanent address,
people without papers, people without property, peo-
ple without nationality, and most troubling of them all
people without states. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
(1987) said ‘history is always written from the sedentary
point of view and in the name of a unitary State appa-
ratus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is
nomads.’ We need to see that geography—the ways in
which people constitute themselves through space—is
just as constitutive as history for how a people comes
to be. What distinguishes peoples such as hill peoples
or forest peoples or people without papers is that they
are described by sedentary peoples, that is, from the
perspective of states organized as a bounded a territory.
For all the tensions, contaminations, gaps, and fractures
that are identified between the whole and its parts by
Agamben, Rancière, and Laclau what is not recognized
is that from the perspective of the state a ‘proper’ peo-
ple is always seen as coextensive with a given territory.
Stuart Elden’s (2013) genealogy of the concept of terri-
tory painstakingly documents its social production. He
traces how juridico-political discourse produces state as
a bounded territory as the name of that space. We need
to see that ‘Western’ political thought takes that concept
of territory as granted, perhaps seeing it like a state as
Scott (1999) describes it. But seen from another perspec-
tive (more on that below) the parts that don’t count of-
ten are mobile peoples who were subjected to domesti-
cation to become a part of the people. The territory that
bounds the people as a whole differentiates mobile peo-
ples as residual or remainder parts. The remainders of
the whole, the parts that don’t count remain as mobile
peoples: nomads, seafarers, pirates, travellers, migrants,
refugees, itinerants, gypsies, wanderers. These mobile
peoples find it impossible to constitute themselves as po-
litical subjects precisely because they cannot be coexten-
sive with a territory as they remain peoples without ge-
ography. The idea of territory as a bounded space under
the control of a people organized through a state that
constitutes them as the people of that state remains the
dominant image in political thought and overcoming it
(i.e., thinking differently about histories and geographies
of peoples) is a difficult task.
The second obstacle to understanding the fracture
between peoples and the people is that the difference
is seldom between a people that constitutes itself as the
dominant (the people) and the other as the dominated
(peoples). It is often more fine-grained than that opposi-
tion implies. It is more like a spectrum of various peoples
and how individuals take (and give) positions across this
spectrum: strangers, outsiders, and aliens. Often people
move through (or find themselves in) multiple and inter-
secting positions across this spectrum (Isin, 2002, 2017).
As Scott (2017) puts it ‘a great many barbarians, then,
were not primitives who had stayed or been left behind
but rather political and economic refugees who had fled
to the periphery to escape state-induced poverty, taxes,
bondage, and war.’ Citizens can become barbarians and
barbarians can become citizens.
Scott’s work on the history of early states is a major
contribution to thinking about how a people comes to
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be and how a differentiation between the people and
peoples is often established along sedentary versus no-
madic, state versus non-state, and civilized versus barbar-
ian lines (Scott, 2009, 2017). Scott (2017) recognizes that
what we most know about historical geography of peo-
ples have beenwritten from the perspective of sedentary
peoples settled in each territory as a state. How these
peoples developed control over a territory by knitting
together various patchwork of hinterlands and periph-
eries and subjugating peoples in these spaces into state
peoples provides a glimpse of how subjugated peoples
are almost invariably mobile peoples—barbarians—who
were not simply outside the state but were subjugated
in various differentiated categories. Scott uses ‘barbar-
ian’ as a generic concept of mobile peoples whom states
were either not able to subjugate or, more interestingly,
actually created as residual peoples who escaped subju-
gation. Scott’s seemingly simple but effective narrative
is about how we might see history from the perspec-
tive of those whom were subjugated to states—a histor-
ical geography of mobile peoples. Scott repeatedly re-
minds us that history has been written from the per-
spective of sedentary peoples as a norm. Yet, as he il-
lustrates, since the emergence of early states (not only
between Euphrates and Tigris rivers but also along Yel-
low River and the alluvial plains of South America over
the last ten thousand years or so) only in the last three
or hundred years that states and their sedentary peo-
ples could be said to have established a norm. But as
far as a ‘deep’ history of states is concerned this is rel-
atively recent and exceptional. However, we need to be
careful about recognizing sedentary peoples as a norm
in the last four hundred years. The proliferation of the
migrants and refugees especially in the last two hundred
years and the violent displacements and dislocations of
millions of peoples should give us a pause to think twice
before we accept states of sedentary peoples as a norm
(Jones, 2016; see also Mazard, 2014). Moreover, Scott
draws too sharp a difference between barbarians as non-
state peoples against state peoples. Yet, as he illustrates,
barbarians included various peoples whose relationships
to states were always in flux such peoples, as I have
stated above, came in and out of various barbarian po-
sitions: nomads, savages, pirates, and others. That is one
reasonwhy I would prefer consideringmobile peoples as
‘transversal configurations’ whose affiliations, belonging,
affinities, and movements traverse and intersect various
borders and boundaries, establish associations, assem-
blages, and solidarities through which they act as polit-
ical subjects. Nonetheless, Scott’s critique of the grand
narrative of states as sedentary peoples gives us a longue
durée historical ontology of mobile peoples that paints a
very different picture.
If we are to seemobile peoples as a norm rather than
an exception and as political subjects rather than sub-
ject peoples we need to start with an image of thought
that sees how mobile peoples constitute themselves as
political subjects not in bounded territories but through
transversal configurations. This, as I said earlier, requires
that we address the question how mobile peoples have
become an exception in the first place. How did seden-
tary peoples became a norm that constituted mobile
peoples as an exception? But, it also raises the question
whywe are now constitutingmobile peoples as a norm. If
indeed, we cannot appeal to autonomous facts concern-
ing mobile peoples becoming a norm as it also reflects
how we collect, collate, assemble, and interpret those
facts. This means we cannot be outside the dynamic pro-
cess that Hacking describes how kinds of people come
into being: beginnings of a description, people acting un-
der it, formation of institutions managing people acting
under it, accumulation of knowledge about people act-
ing under it, and regulation of people with expertise, au-
thority, and power. If we are nowmaking upmobile peo-
ples as a norm rather than exception we are participat-
ing in this dynamic process through which mobile peo-
ples are becoming political subjects of and subject to new
modes of government.
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